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1 Introduction  
Since the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 
environmental legal principles, such as the precautionary principle, the polluter-pays 
principle or the principle of public participation, play an ever-increasing role in international 
and national environmental law and policy, as does the concept of sustainable 
development. The concept of sustainable development has become the leading concept in 
environmental policies around the world. The principles included in the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development1 are applied in many international environmental treaties 
and are codified in national legislation. Further endeavours to promote principles of 
environmental law in the international community are carried on with such draft documents 
as the Earth Charter2 by the Earth Council and the IUCN International Covenant on 
Environment and Development.3 With all these rapid developments in international and 
national environmental law, it becomes increasingly necessary to more precisely determine 
what is the legal function of the concept of sustainable development, which I will later call 
an “ideal”, and of the principles of environmental law. What is the relationship between the 
ideal of sustainable development and the legal principles and more concrete environmental 
legal rules, and between the principles and the rules? There is a lot of misunderstanding 
and confusion on this subject, as has been stated rather clearly by Howard Mann:4  
 
 
 
 
 
*  Prof Dr J Verschuuren, Professor of European and International Environmental Law, Tilburg 
University, The Netherlands, and member of the Netherlands Advisory Council for Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment, director of the Centre for Legislative Studies of the Schoordijk 
Institute for Jurisprudence and Comparative Law (Tilburg University) and a member of the 
Commission on Environmental Law of the IUCN as well as a member of the board of the 
Netherlands Committee of the IUCN.  
1   UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/REV. 1/Vol. 1 (1992), reprinted in 1992 ILM 876.  
2   Earth Charter Commission http://www.earthcharter.org 14 Feb, adopted in March 2000.  
3   IUCN http://iucn.org/themes/law/cel07.html 14 Feb (draft).  
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It is difficult to enter into a discussion on principles of international law for 
sustainable development without a sense of [...] confusion. [...] Confusion, 
because perceptions of the nature, status, role and substance of principles have 
become increasingly unclear in the post-Rio period.  
  
 
Although environmental legal principles have the longest history in the field of international 
law, the question of what the consequences of the difference between principles and rules 
for real cases are has not yet been addressed in much detail by international courts and 
tribunals.5 There are some cases where principles of environmental law did play a 
(marginal) role,6 but a principle judgement on the character of principles cannot be found in 
this field of law. On the contrary, in international policy and law, there is a great deal of 
misunderstanding about principles. This was shown, for instance, when the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 1992, was concluded. The United States consistently 
opposed inclusion of an article on principles in the convention, arguing that principles only 
state the intentions of the parties and provide a context for interpreting the commitments 
and that they, therefore, should be included in the preamble only. If the principles were 
commitments, they should be included in the convention as legal rules. Such a vision on 
principles underestimates their role in legal practice and, more in general, fails to 
appreciate the legal meaning of principles and the basic difference between principles and 
legal rules.7 In its extensive work on “Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and 
Sustainable Development”, the Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) has not addressed the question of 
the legal status of these principles at all.8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4  Mann “Comment on the Paper by Philippe Sands” 71.  
5  Sands “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development” 54.  
6  See for instance the Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project 1998 37 ILM 162 before the 
International Court of Justice in which Hungary relied heavily upon the precautionary principle, and 
the case of Balmer-Schafroth v Switzerland ECHR 26 August 1997 Rep 1997-IV, in which only in 
dissenting opinions the precautionary principle played a (small) part. See on the latter: Craven 1998 
RECIEL 1-95.  
7  Bodansky 1993 Yale J of International Law 501-502.  
8  Experts Group on Environmental Law Environmental Protection 
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This lack of attention for the legal status of principles is not typical of international 
environmental law only. The European Court of Justice was willing to test against 
environmental legal principles laid down in the EC Treaty (the present article 174, formerly 
article 130R) only in a small amount of cases.9 The EC-legislator does not systematically 
refer to these principles in environmental directives or regulations. In national 
environmental law, things are not much different. Although the legislator, in many countries 
all over the world, is now in the process of explicit codification of environmental legal 
principles, a substantive discussion on the question what is the purpose of such a 
codification is very often refrained from.10  
  
The confusion is partly caused by the fact that many norms or policy statements are called 
“principles”. The frequent and often irrational use of the word “principle” has given it a 
rather unclear status. Highly abstract notions like sustainable development or biodiversity, 
but also human rights and procedural rules on environmental impact assessment: we can 
retrace them all as “principles” in the various declarations and treaties of the international 
community, most notably in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 
and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.11   
  
In this article, I would like to get a grip on the “things” lawyers call “principles” of 
environmental law. For a long time, a principle was considered to be a special kind of 
norm, characterized by a rather general meaning, differentiating it from the more concrete 
legal rules. Principles go beyond concrete rules or policy goals; instead, they say 
something about a group of rules or policies, they denote what a collection of rules has in 
common, or what the common goal is of a collection of rules (for instance a statute). 
Principles usually contain a high moral and/or legal value.  
 
 
 
 9   The Safety Hi-Tech cases of 14 July 1998 were only the first examples of such willingness to test 
against the principles of environmental law laid down in a 130R of the EC-Treaty, Cases C-284/95 
and C-341/95 (CURIA  18 Apr).  
10  An example is the codification of environmental law in Belgium, where those that drafted the 
principles only gave reasons for the content of the principles, not for their inclusion in the new 
environmental legislation, Draft Decree on Environmental Policy for the Flemish Region, reprinted in 
Bocken and Ryckbost (eds) Codification of Environmental Law  161-163.  
11   UN Doc A/CONF 48/14/REV 1 (1972) and UN Doc A/CONF151/26/Rev 1/Vol I (1992), reprinted in 
1992 ILM 876.  
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This, however, leaves at least three fundamental questions unanswered:  
1. Where does this high moral value come from?  
2. What is the exact difference between a principle and a legal rule, and between a 
principle and a policy?  
3. What is the relationship between a principle and more concrete legal rules and 
policies?  
  
 
The first question is the most difficult one. Fuller has convincingly shown that in law, a 
distinction must be made between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration.12 The 
morality of duty  
  
…lays down basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible, or 
without which an ordered society directed toward certain specific goals must fail 
of its mark.13   
  
The “principles”14 of a morality of aspiration are  
  
…loose, vague, and indeterminate, and present us rather with a general idea of 
the perfection we ought to aim at, than afford us any certain and infallible 
directions acquiring it.15   
 
 
 
  
12  Fuller Morality of Law  5 ff.  
13  Fuller Morality of Law 5-6.  
14  Although Fuller uses the word “principle” here, I wish to reserve the term “principle” for legal 
principles, not for ideals or values as in the sense of Fuller’s “principles of the morality of aspiration”. 
Selznick Moral Commonwealth 438 does not make a clear distinction between principles and values 
either. He calls legal principles “legally recognized values”.  
15  Fuller Morality of Law 6.  
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In more modern terms, such values could be described as the ideals of society or of a 
more specific community. In the next paragraph, I will try to show that in these ideals the 
basis for legal principles can be found (paragraph 2).  
  
In paragraphs 3 and 4, the second and third questions will be dealt with. Basically, I will 
start from Dworkin’s16 distinction between rules, principles, and policies and elaborate on 
this distinction a little further, taking examples from the field of environmental law.   
  
In paragraph 5 of this article, I will have a closer look at the specific character of the field of 
environmental policy and law. Since the ideal of sustainable development is of a rather 
anthropocentric nature, the question arises whether this ideal can actually be fit to be the 
goal that should be reached through applying legal principles and rules.  
  
For reasons of clarity, I wish to point out that the subject of this article is principles of 
environmental law. A distinction can be made between general principles of law, being 
principles that are valid for all fields of law (for example the principle of equality of arms), 
and legal principles that are valid for a specific field of the law, i.e. environmental law. 
Although I realise that not all writers make this distinction in their thinking and writing about 
principles (especially in the Anglo-American literature), I draw from their writings as well.17 
The character of this article is that of legal theory. I will not go into the meaning of any 
specific environmental legal principle for legal practice, such as the precautionary principle, 
the prevention principle, or the polluter pays principle.18  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
16   Dworkin Model of Rules I 22 ff.  
17   Most writers only mention general legal principles. Selznick Moral Commonwealth 431-432, for 
instance, mentions the principles of entitlement, justification, equality, impartiality, proportionality, 
reciprocity, rectification, need, desert, and participation.   
18   There are many publications that do just that. Highly recommended in this respect is De Sadeleer  
 Environmental Principles, who goes into these three principels in great detail.  
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2   From ideals to principles  
2.1  The pursuit of ideals: sustainable development  
Ideals have been defined as  
  
…values that are implicit or latent in the law, or the public and moral culture of a 
society or group that usually cannot be fully realized, and that partly transcend 
contingent, historical formulations, and implementations in terms of rules and 
principles.19  
  
It is clear that this definition of an ideal is not very different from the morality of aspiration, 
as formulated by Fuller. Ideals are an expression of the morality of aspiration, without direct 
relevance to the law. They are vague ideas about what is morally the best thing to do. This 
can only be a vague idea, since we do not know what is perfectly good human conduct.20 
We do not want “to pin (a man) to the wall with the final articulation of his highest good”, we 
do “know enough to create the conditions that will permit a man to lift himself up”.21 What 
we want with the formulation of an ideal is to show what, in the end, is the ultimate goal of 
society, or, as Fuller puts it:   
  
One of the highest responsibilities of the morality of aspiration is to preserve 
and enrich (the) social inheritance.22  
  
A well-known example of an ideal in the field of environmental policy is the ideal of 
sustainable development.23 The idea of sustainable development as an ideal for future 
environmental policy originated in the early 1970s. Illustrative in this respect is the last 
paragraph of the famous “A Blueprint for Survival” by Goldsmith and others:24   
19  Van der Burg 1997 Journal of Value Inquiry 25, and Van der Burg Morality of Aspiration 176. Alexy 
Zum Begriff des Rechtsprinzips 81 has a somewhat different definition, emphasizing legal norms rather 
than values: “(...) jedes Sollen, das nicht voraussetzt, daß das, was gesollt ist, in vollem Umfang 
tatsächlich und rechtlich möglich ist, das dafür aber möglichst weitgehende oder approximative Erfüllung 
verlangt.”  
 
 
20  Fuller Morality of Law 10.  
21  Fuller Morality of Law 12.  
22  Fuller Morality of Law 13.  
23  I will call the idea of sustainable development an ideal or a value. I will later on in this section and in  
the next show why this idea can be seen as an ideal. It is also possible to apply my theory on the 
relationship between an ideal and legal principles on the ideal of the conservation of biodiversity, cf 
Verschuuren and Oudenaarden The Role of Ideals 231-262.  
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 Our task is to create a society which is sustainable and which will give the 
fullest possible satisfaction to its members. Such a society by definition would 
depend not on expansion but on stability. This does not mean to say that it 
would be stagnant Cindeed it could well afford more variety than does the state 
of uniformity at present being imposed by the pursuit of technological efficiency. 
We believe that the stable society [...], as well as removing the sword of 
Damocles which hangs over the heads of future generations, is much more 
likely than the present one to bring peace and fulfilment which hitherto have 
been regarded, sadly, as utopian.  
  
The idea of sustainable development really came into fashion in 1987 with the publication 
of the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development “Our Common 
Future”. In this report, sustainable development was described as  
  
…a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of 
investments, the orientation of technological development and institutional 
change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to 
meet human needs and aspirations.25  
  
The work of the WCED was inspired by an urgent call of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations to   
  
…help define shared perceptions of long-term environmental issues and the 
appropriate efforts needed to deal successfully with the problems of protecting 
and enhancing the environment, a long-term agenda for action during the 
coming decades and aspirational goals for the future.26   
  
The WCED has clearly come up with such an aspiration: man is responsible for the future 
of the earth. Today’s generation may not fulfil its needs while endangering the possibility 
for future generations to fulfil their needs. And also, environmental problems related to the 
(economical and technical) development of developed countries may not hamper the 
possibilities of developing countries to strive for (economical and technical) development 
as well.27 With the introduction of the concept of sustainable development, economic 
development, the environment, and human rights are treated in an integrated and 
interdependent manner.28  
 
24  Goldsmith 1972 The Ecologist 1-22.  
25  WCED Our Common Future 46.  
26  WCED Our Common Future ix.  
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To reach this goal, the WCED made several proposals for institutional and legal change, so 
that the ecological dimensions of policy be considered at the same time as the economic, 
trade, energy, agricultural, industrial, and other relevant dimensions.29 Legal change 
means, among other things, that sustainable development objectives are incorporated in all 
governmental (legislative and administrative) actions on a national level, worldwide (I later 
will call this “(external) integration”, cf section B).30 Also, risks of irreversible damage to the 
environment must be assessed and diminished (the precautionary approach, cf section 
B).31 Thirdly, the role of NGOs and private and community groups in environmental policy 
must be recognized and strengthened.32 Such policy goals (the WCED report mentions 
many more) can be seen as an effort to make the rather abstract ideal of “sustainable 
development” more concrete. The same is done by the formulation of legal principles by a 
working group of the WCED, included in the report of the WCED itself. I will elaborate on 
these in the next two sections.  
  
Since the publication of the WCED report, the idea of sustainable development, as an 
ideal, has been firmly recognised in non-binding UN declarations, as well as in many 
national or supranational legal documents. For instance, since the changes made by the 
Maastricht Treaty, article 2 of the EC-Treaty mentions the achievement of sustainable 
development a fundamental objective of the European Union.33 In the Belgian Act on 
Environmental Policy, sustainable development has been laid down as the main goal of 
environmental policy,34 which is the case in many other countries as well. Article 4 of the 
Japanese Basic Environmental Law of 1993, for instance, states:35  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27  Some consider the fact that developing countries were able to influence international environmental  
 norms to this extent UNCED’s most important step forward, Porras Rio Declaration 33.  
28  Sands “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development” 53.  
29  WCED Our Common Future 313.  
30  WCED Our Common Future 314.  
31  WCED Our Common Future 323.  
32  WCED Our Common Future 328.  
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Environmental conservation shall be promoted so that a society can be 
formulated where the healthy and productive environment is conserved and 
sustainable development is ensured by fostering sound economic development 
with reduced environmental load [...].  
  
By 1992, when the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) took place in Rio de Janeiro, sustainable development had become an ideal that 
no one could ignore. All the documents signed at the Rio Conference state, in one way or 
another, that everything that had been agreed on was necessary in order to reach 
sustainable development. The preamble to Agenda 21, for instance, starts with the 
following lines:36  
  
Humanity stands at a defining moment in history. We are confronted with a 
perpetuation of disparities between and within nations, a worsening of poverty, 
hunger, ill health and illiteracy, and the continuing deterioration of the 
ecosystems on which we depend for our well-being. However, integration of 
environment and development concerns and greater attention to them will lead 
to the fulfilment of basic needs, improving living standards for all, better 
protected and managed ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous future. No 
nation can achieve this on its own; but together we can B in a global partnership 
for sustainable development.  
 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which was concluded during the 
UNCED as well, states in Principle 1:37  
  
Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They 
are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.  
 
 
 
33  Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 Offical 
Journal C 304/173 ff.  
34   A 1.2.1 ‘ 1 of the Law of 5 April 1995, Belgian Bulletin of Acts and Orders of 3 June 1995, reprinted 
in Bocken and Ryckbost (eds) Codification of Environmental Law.  
35  A 4 Law No 91 of 1993 (translation: Japanese Ministry of the Environment).  
36  UN Doc A/CONF 151/26/Vol I-III reprinted in Johnson Earth Summit 129.  
37  UN Doc A/CONF 151/26/REV 1/Vol 1 1992, reprinted in 1992 ILM 876.  
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Apart from these very general (non-binding) international documents, the ideal of 
sustainable development can also be found in more concrete (binding) treaties, like the 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 11 
December 1997. Article 2 of this Protocol reads:38  
  
Each Party included in Annex I, in achieving its quantified emission limitation 
and reduction commitments under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable 
development, shall: (a). ... etc.  
  
The Kyoto Protocol then gives more concrete rules, the most important being that overall 
emissions of greenhouse gases should be reduced by each of the parties to the Protocol 
by 5 per cent, relative to 1990, in the period 2008 to 2012, followed by rules on monitoring, 
on review teams, and on a “clean development mechanism” to help parties not included in 
Annex I (developing countries that could not agree to a certain emission reduction target) 
in  
  
…achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate 
objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in 
achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments.39  
  
At the European level, the ideal of sustainable development has been explicitly mentioned 
in various EC Directives. Directives very often state in their preamble that the provisions 
are necessary to promote “the principle of sustainable development”. The Council Directive 
concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control40 (IPPC) gives concrete rules on 
permits for certain branches of industry. Certain installations, in, for instance the energy, 
mineral, metal or chemical industries, can only be operated after a permit has been 
granted. The permit must include requirements ensuring that a high level of protection is 
given to the environment as a whole. The ultimate goal is to promote sustainable 
development.41   
 
 
38  FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add 1, reprinted in 1998 ILM 22.  
39  A 3(1), 4, 6 and 12 open up the possibility of so-called “joint implementation”, although this term itself 
was dropped during the process of negotiation, cf Breidenich et al 1998 AJIL 324-325.  
40  Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control 1996 Official Journal L 257/26.  
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Another recent example is the Directive on Ambient Air Quality Assessment and 
Management, which, in its preamble describes one of the goals to be reached as follows:  
  
In zones and agglomerations where the levels of pollutants are below the limit 
values, Member States must endeavour to preserve the best ambient air quality 
compatible with sustainable development.42   
  
The concrete rules in this Directive concern limit values for certain pollutants, to be set by 
the European Commission, which have consequences for those zones where the levels of 
these pollutants are higher than the limit levels. In areas where the levels are lower  
  
…Member States shall maintain the levels of pollutants in these zones and 
agglomerations below the limit values and shall endeavour to preserve the best 
ambient air quality, compatible with sustainable development.43   
  
Note that in this Directive the ideal of sustainable development is included in a concrete 
rule as well. I will go into this matter in paragraph 4.  
  
Although sustainable development is sometimes referred to as a “principle” (cf Principle 1 
of the Rio Declaration, article 3(1) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
and the IPPC Directive, mentioned above),44 I think it is safe to call the goal of sustainable 
development an ideal.45 Looking at Fuller’s morality of aspiration, it is true that the ideal of 
sustainable development, as formulated in the various legal documents, does not lay down 
basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible, or without which an ordered 
society directed toward certain specific goals must fail of its mark (morality of duty), but 
instead, that it is a loose, vague, and indeterminate, general idea of the perfection we 
ought to aim at. We, as well as generations to come, will need to aspire to reach the goal of 
sustainable development, without anticipating reaching it.46  
 
41   The preamble states under no 9: “Whereas this Directive [...] lays down the measures necessary to 
implement integrated pollution prevention and control in order to achieve a high level of protection 
for the environment as a whole; whereas application of the principle of sustainable development will 
be promoted by an integrated approach to pollution control; [...]”. Note that the word “principle” is 
used here to denote the ideal of sustainable development. I will go into this below and in s 2.2 of this 
paragraph.   
42   Council Directive 96/62/EC of 27 September 1996 on Ambient Air Quality Assessment and 
 Management 1996 Official Journal L 296/55.  
43   A 9 of Directive 96/62/EC.  
44   For the IPPC Directive, see above and n 29. See for an example in the literature Nollkaemper Legal 
Regime for Transboundary Water Pollution 82.  
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Van der Burg’s definition of an ideal, however, only partly fits the above description of the 
value of sustainable development. It is true that sustainable development is a value that 
cannot be fully realised and that partly transcends contingent, historical formulations and 
implementations in terms of rules and principles. On the other hand, however, the “ideal” of 
sustainable development has been laid down in various important legal documents, not as 
rules or legal principles, but as an ideal. Thus, either “sustainable development” is an ideal, 
but then the definition has to be changed to: “values that are explicit, implicit or latent in the 
law, ... etc.”, or “sustainable development” is not an ideal but a (legal) principle.  
  
The latter position seems to be supported by the wording of the Rio Declaration (see 
above). Still, in the next section I will argue that “sustainable development” is an ideal and 
not a principle.  
  
  
2.2   The relationship between ideals and principles  
In the previous section, I have shown that the idea of sustainable development is a vague 
and undeterminate goal society aims at to reach perfection; a goal of high moral standard 
that the entire world community has embraced. To promote this goal, that never can be 
fully reached, a call upon the morality of duty must be made. In other words: more concrete 
economic, legal, and social instruments must be brought into action to generate a more 
sustainable use of the resources of the Earth.  
 
 
 
45   Although Sands “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development” 57-58 calls sustainable
 development a “legal principle”, he also shows that there are “principles underlying the concept of 
 sustainable development”, showing that the concept of sustainable development is much more than 
 a legal principle.  
46   Mann Comment on the Paper by Philippe Sands 71.  
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In this article I focus on the legal instruments.47 I will show that a first step to make the ideal 
more concrete is the formulation of (legal) principles, and that, in order to apply these 
principles, certain (even more concrete) rules are developed.   
  
Principles can be seen as the link between ideals and duties, between the morality of 
aspiration and the morality of duty, between values and rules.48 Principles can be part of 
written, formal law, can be part of legislation and treaties, can, together with more concrete 
rules (in combination with those rules) impose duties on the state or on individuals. On the 
other hand, principles themselves do not comprise enforceable legal duties.49 They do, 
however, shed more light on the (moral) targets of legislative rules and thus form the link 
between the morality of aspiration and the morality of duty. Principles are a necessary 
medium for ideals to find their way into concrete rules. They can be used to bridge the gap 
between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration. Because of their basis in 
(written or unwritten) law and their possible direct and intense influence on legal rules 
concerning activities that may harm the environment, they must be placed within the 
morality of duty: a bridgehead within the morality of duty reaching out for the morality of 
aspiration.50  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47  Besides legal instruments, social and economic instruments can be important as well in the 
 realisation of environmental policy objectives. Many of such instruments have also been included in 
 international environmental treaties, like emissions trading and other market-based mechanisms in
 the Kyoto Protocol, cf Breidenich et al 1998 AJIL 323-325.  
48   MacCormick  1974 Law Quarterly Rev 127; Selznick Moral Commonwealth 439.  
49   It must be acknowledged, however, that this distinction is not a very strict one: there is a sliding 
scale with a theoretical abstract and undeterminate principle on one side and a very concrete, highly 
practical rule on the other. See further in par 3 under 3.1.  
50   Contrary to Van der Burg Morality of Aspiration 179, who argues that principles and policies, 
together with ideals, all are categories of the sphere of aspiration, leaving only legal rules in the 
sphere of duty.  
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Legal principles have long played an important role in the law. Without going into the role of 
principles too deeply now (cf. paragraph 3), I wish to point at three main functions of legal 
principles:  
 
1. Principles fill in open or unclear rules; they can be used in the process of interpreting 
rules in concrete cases by administrative authorities as well as by the courts; or in 
the words of Selznick: a principle is a window to justice.51  
2. Principles form the basis for new (national and EU) legislation or (international) 
treaties;  
3. Principles form the basis for self-regulation or otherwise help to determine how 
private parties should behave in the social order.  
  
 
For now, I would like to take the position that principles are part of written, statutory law 
and that they can be invoked in court and thus form a part of the morality of duty, albeit 
they are of a more normative and abstract nature than legal rules. The ideals or values 
behind these principles form the morality of aspiration, sustainable development being the 
prime example in the field of environmental law.52  
  
If we accept this thesis, it is obvious that such an ideal makes itself felt above all in the 
more abstract norms within the legal systems: the legal principles. Vague and 
indeterminate as ideals are, it is not very well understandable that they directly influence 
concrete legal rules like procedural rules for decision-making or for appeal, or substantive 
rules like the exact limit value for SO2 emissions.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51  Selznick Moral Commonwealth 440.  
52  Contrary to Alexy Zum Begriff des Rechtsprinzips 81, who states that principles themselves are 
ideals that can never be fully realised. Alexy, however, does point at a difference between an 
“ideales Sollen” and a “reales Sollen”; “ideales Sollen” is very much comparable to my definition of 
an ideal (cf s 2.1); whenever duties or norms are recognised, one can speak of ““reales Sollen”. The 
latter position appears to correspond more to my own.  
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Ideals, however, are, as far as their nature and functions are concerned, more comparable 
to legal principles. Principles, as we have already seen, go beyond concrete rules or policy 
goals; instead they say something about a group of rules or policy goals, they indicate what 
a collection of rules has in common, or what the common goal is of a collection of rules (for 
instance a statute). Principles usually contain a high moral and/or legal value. Principles 
thus form a first attempt to make ideals more concrete.  
  
Although the character of ideals and principles may seem somewhat alike, there is a 
fundamental difference. Legal principles are important norms that, although different in 
nature from legal rules, can be applied in day-to-day legal practice, and thus form a part of 
the morality of duty. Later on in this essay I will show the relevance of principles for 
concrete administrative decisions, like the decision on granting a permit, and for concrete 
judicial decisions, like the judgement on whether or not the government did rightfully allow 
drilling for oil in an area of great ecological value. While principles can be directly applied in 
the law, this is not the case with ideals, like the ideal of sustainable development. This ideal 
is so vague and abstract53 that the legislator and other actors in legal processes need to 
clarify it by making and applying principles and rules. It therefore is not very useful to call 
this ideal a “principle”.54 The ideal of sustainable development simply cannot serve as a 
beacon indicating the direction legal development should take because profound 
differences of opinion exist with regard not only to the means by which these goals are to 
be reached, but also the exact meaning of the goals themselves.55  
  
 
 
 
 
  
53    Kidd 1992 Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics 1-26 has shown that the idea of 
        sustainable development was compiled of six separate strains of thought that are widely diverse  
       and incompatible, which explains the vagueness and the difficulty to apply the idea in practice.  
54    Although I find his example of the “principle of informed consent” (which looks more like a rule to  
me) not very convincing, I agree with Van der Burg 1997 Journal of Value Inquiry 26 that it is not 
useful totransform an ideal into a very vague and broad principle that is of little practical use. 
Unfortunately, the ideal of sustainable development is sometimes called a “principle”, as was shown 
above (s 2.1).  
55   See further on this matter Verschuuren and Oudenaarden Role of Ideals 235-240.  
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How then does an ideal affect legal principles? Let’s return to the ideal of sustainable 
development to find an answer to this question.  
  
At the international level, there are many treaties, declarations, and policy documents in 
which the value of sustainable development is put forward as the ultimate goal of that 
specific treaty. More general documents like the (non-binding) Rio Declaration and Agenda 
21 contain a lot of principles that have to be achieved in order to reach a sustainable 
society.56 While Agenda 21 is a policy document which refers to relevant principles when 
necessary, the Rio Declaration is a true catalogue of environmental legal principles that are 
considered by the world community to be important for environmental and development 
policy and law. Many of the principles state that they have to be promoted in order to 
achieve a sustainable society (literally so in Principles 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 20, 21, 22, 24 and 
27). The WCED, too, has adopted a set of legal principles; they are included in the report 
“Our Common Future”.57 As mentioned above, it was this report that worked as a catalyst 
in making the ideal of sustainable development a flourishing ideal in the international 
community. The WCED principles, which, according to the mandate of the Experts Group 
that drafted the “Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Sustainable 
Development”, ought to be in place “to support [...] sustainable development”, include such 
principles as the co-operation principle (Principle 8):  
  
States shall co-operate in good faith with other States in implementing the 
preceding rights and obligations.  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
56  Bodnarek Concept of Sustainable Development 102-106 states rather loosely that these are “the 
guiding principles of sustainable development”. He seems to suggest that realisation of all of the Rio 
Principles leads to sustainable development. Schröder Sustainable Development and Law  5 has 
more or less the same approach.  
57  A “Summary of the Proposed Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Sustainable 
Development adopted by the WCED Experts Group on Environmental Law” was included as Annex 
1 in the report, WCED Our Common Future 348 ff. The Final Report of the Experts Group itself (with 
slightly differently formulated principles, dated June 1986) has been published seperately (Experts 
Group on Environmental Law Environmental Protection).  
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And the principle of prevention58 and abatement (Principle 10):  
  
States shall prevent or abate any transboundary environmental interference 
which could cause or causes significant harm [...].  
  
Examples from the Rio Declaration are the precautionary principle (Principle 15):  
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.  
  
And the principle of integration (Principle 4):  
  
In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall 
constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be 
considered in isolation from it.  
  
These principles can be found in more specific (binding) treaties as well. The 1992 Helsinki 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes states in article 2(5):59  
  
The parties shall be guided by the precautionary principle, by virtue of which 
action to avoid the potential transboundary impact of the release of hazardous 
substances shall not be postponed on the ground that scientific research has 
not fully proved a causal link between those substances, on the one hand, and 
the potential transboundary impact, on the other hand; [...]  
  
Or, on the same principle, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the North East Atlantic, article 2(2):60  
The contracting Parties shall apply the precautionary principle, by virtue of 
which preventive measures are to be taken when there are reasonable grounds 
for concern that substances or energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into the 
marine environment may bring about hazards to human health, harm living 
resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with other 
legitimate uses of the sea even when there is no conclusive evidence of a 
causal relationship between the inputs and the effects.  
 
 
 
58   The word “could” also indicates the precautionary principle. In the Final Report of the Experts 
Group on Environmental Law Environmental Protection 79, the words “significant risk” were used 
instead of “could”. According to the comment on this principle, certain dangerous activities will no 
longer be considered unlawful when all possible precautionary measures have been taken to 
preclude the materialisation of the risk. See Backes and Verschuuren 1998 Colorado J of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 58.  
59   1992 ILM 1312.  
60   1992 ILM 1069.  
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Very often, the principles of environmental law are more or less “hidden” in more concrete 
rules. Especially in the more detailed treaties, we find them hidden in subordinate clauses, 
like the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (Principle 7 of the Rio 
Declaration) in article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol:  
  
All parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and their specific national and regional development priorities, [....]61  
  
The same situation (i.e. principles being codified as a principle or “hidden” in more concrete 
legal rules) can be observed at the European and at national levels. Already since 1987, 
important principles of (EC) environmental law have been codified in the EC Treaty.62 
Currently, article 174(2), in which the principles of precaution, prevention, rectification at 
source, and the “polluter pays” principle have been included, reads as follows:  
  
Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection 
taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the 
Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the 
principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage 
should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.  
  
The principle of integration has been explicitly laid down in the Chapter entitled “Principles”, 
in article 6 of the Treaty:63  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61   Other examples in the Kyoto Protocol are the precautionary principle (a 3(4), “taking into account 
uncertainties”), and the principle of cooperation and transfer of technologies (a 10), both of which 
can be found in the Rio Declaration as well (Principles 15 and 9 respectively).  
62   Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 Offical 
Journal C 304/173 ff.  
63 Id.  
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Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition 
and implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in 
Article 3, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.  
  
The Council Directive concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control64 (IPPC) 
states it is in compliance with the “polluter pays” principle and the principle of pollution 
prevention (consideration no 1), while article 3(a) of the Directive prescribes that measures 
to control pollution must be in accordance with the principle of best available techniques. 
Although not explicitly mentioned, the precautionary principle plays a role in the Directive 
since Article 3(f) states that  
  
…the necessary measures are taken upon definitive cessation of activities to 
avoid any pollution risk and return the site of operation to a satisfactory state.  
  
In the preamble of the revised Council Directive on the Assessment of the Effects of 
Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment,65 to take just another example of 
an important environmental directive, it is considered that the Directive on environmental 
impact assessment is necessary since,   
  
…pursuant to article 130r (2) of the Treaty (old numbering, JV), Community 
policy on the environment is based on the precautionary principle and on the 
principle that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage 
should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.  
  
In national legislation, principles have also been laid down in statutes, and there are 
ongoing discussions on the codification of principles of environmental law. In the Flemish 
Region in Belgium, the same principles mentioned in article 174 of the EC Treaty have 
been laid down, after the goals for environmental policy have been formulated (goals that 
have to be promoted for the benefit of present and future generations).66 The first goal is: 
“to manage the environment by means of the sustainable use of natural resources [...]”.67 
In Germany, a proposal has been made for the codification of three important 
environmental legal principles: the precautionary principle, the “polluter pays” principle and 
the co-operation principle.68  
 
64   Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and 
control 1996 Official Journal L 257/26.  
65  Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997 amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of 
the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment 1997 Official Journal L 073/55.  
66   N 34 above A 1.2.1 ‘ 1.  
67   N 34 above A 1.2.1 ‘ 1. The principles have been laid down in a 1.2.1 ‘ 2.  
68   Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, Entwurf Umwelt-gesetzbuch 
(UGB-KomE), 1997. The “polluter pays” principle has been formulated as “Verursacherprinzip” 
(perpetrator principle), giving it a wider meaning than just “the polluter pays”. Cf, among many 
others, Sendler 1996 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1145-1151.  
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These principles already play an important role in German environmental law. Since 
the early 1970s, the precautionary principle is the key principle in discussions on the 
Emissions Control Act and the Nuclear Energy Act. Like in the Flemish Decree, in the 
German proposal, targets for an environmentally sound development have been laid 
down as well; objectives that have to be promoted because of the responsibility for 
future generations.69 In France, general principles of environmental law were codified in 
1995, including (among other things) the precautionary principle, the “polluter pays” 
principle, and the principle of participation.70 In Australia environmental legal principles, 
such as the precautionary principle and the principle of inter-generational equity, have 
been codified in the Environment and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. Since then, 
especially the precautionary plays a major role in Australian case law.71  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
69   § 4: “Der Schutz der Umwelt und des Menschen ist, auch in Verantwortung für die künftigen 
Generationen, insbesondere dadurch zu gewährleisten, daß: (...)”.  
70   Loi 95-101 du 2 février 1995 relative au renforcement de la protection de l”environnement. See 
Jégouzo 1995 RFD adm 12(2) 209-217. The text of the principles is reprinted in an article by Cans 
1995 Revue Juridique de l”Environnement 195-217.  
71   Environment and Biodiversity Conservation Act 91 of 1999. See Fisher and Harding Precautionary 
Principle in Australia 215-233. For a more detailed discussion of the situation in Australia, Germany, 
The Netherlands, Belgium and Finland, see Verschuuren Principles of Environmental Law  109-128.  
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2.3  Principles and principles  
I already showed that sometimes an ideal is called a “principle” and that this is not very 
useful. On the other side of the spectrum, there can be misunderstanding on the difference 
between principles and concrete legal rules. These misunderstandings originate from the 
different character of different principles. Not all the “things” lawyers call principles can be 
seen as the above-mentioned link between ideals and concrete legal rules. Some 
principles are more principle than others. Some principles form a beachhead of law and 
ethics:72 they help us discover the foundations for decisions to be taken and judgements to 
be made.73 Others are less abstract, more like rules. Individual legal principles can be put 
on a sliding scale, from very abstract and of a high morality, to very concrete and precise; 
they cover almost all the space between an ideal, on the one hand, and a rule, on the 
other.   
  
Take, for instance the principle that  
  
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of 
life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, 
and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for 
present and future generations (...)’ (Principle 1 of the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment)74  
  
And the principle that  
  
Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be 
undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse 
impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national 
authority (Principle 17 of the 1992 Rio Declaration).  
  
The first principle has a higher “morality of aspiration” character than the second one. 
While the first principle sets a vague and indeterminate goal, without giving the one perfect 
way of reaching it, the second one is much closer to day-to-day legal practice. It has much 
more the character of the morality of duty, and, one could argue, has almost reached the 
status of a legal rule, i.e. the rule saying that the contracting State must set up a system of 
environmental impact assessment.  
 
 
 
72  Vranken Algemeen Deel 86.  
73  Scholten Rechtsbeginselen 270.  
74  N 11 above.  
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One could even argue that the latter is not a principle at all, but a concrete legal rule. In the 
field of environmental law alone, there are dozens of principles giving direction to legal 
decisions, such as the granting of a permit by a governmental authority, a court decision on 
a case between a polluter and an environmental action group, the issuing of legislation by 
the national or lower legislator. Do all these “things” that are called principles have to have 
the same role in law?  
  
It cannot be denied, that in negotiation processes on environmental treaties or declarations 
with many nations involved, principles, because of their vague character and because of 
the fact that they are not directly legally binding, can be agreed upon more easily. Mann 
correctly noted that sometimes principles have more meaning and impact as a record of 
the political bargains that underlie a Convention, than as hard or soft-law obligations in 
themselves.75 When looking at “things” that are called principles, this must be kept in mind.  
  
In the end, I think there are four arguments, to explain the difference in the character of 
principles:  
1. principles can take various forms, varying from very abstract to very precise, and 
from a high morality of aspiration to a high morality of duty;  
2. people who draft laws and treaties are not aware of the character of principles and 
make legal rules which they inaccurately call principles;  
3. people who draft laws and treaties are aware of the character of principles, but 
because of the failure to conclude to legally binding rules, they call the rules 
“principles”, indicating the non-binding character of the rules;  
4. a combination of the above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75  Mann Comment on the Paper by Philippe Sands 70.  
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In my opinion, the fourth possibility is the most likely one, considering national and 
international environmental legal practice today. The consequence of this observation is 
that it is essential that each principle must be valued in its own respect. The more concrete 
a principle is, the more it can be treated as a rule and the easier it is to directly apply it in a 
concrete case.  
  
Without going too deeply into the matter of the degree to which principles are legally 
binding (the rest of the essay deals with that question), it has to be noted that, although 
there are as many differences as there are principles, Dworkin’s theoretical distinction 
between principles and rules remains in tact. Generally it can be said that principles “state 
a reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision”;76 the 
direction they point at is a desirable direction because of “justice, or fairness or some other 
dimension of morality”.77 The latter is of great importance to me: although principles form a 
part of the morality of duty, the substantive meaning of a principle lies closer to the morality 
of aspiration than is the case with concrete rules. This explains why principles form a 
beachhead within the morality of duty, reaching out towards the morality of aspiration. It 
also explains why a principle in a concrete case can yield to another principle, while 
retaining its significance.78  
  
I agree with the critics of Dworkin’s distinction, that rules do not always have an all or 
nothing character, and that often rules cannot easily be applied in a concrete case either, 
and that rules, just as principles, may conflict without harming the value of either of these 
rules.79 The basic difference between rules and principles lies in the higher moral character 
of principles and in their role as a link between ideals and legal rules. This difference in 
character has many implications for the meaning of principles in legal practice. One of the 
implications is that principles can only function and only have a meaning in connection with 
rules. The meaning of a legal principle even depends on the context of the rules, applicable 
in a given case.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76  Dworkin Model of Rules I 26.  
77  Dworkin Model of Rules I 22.  
78  Taekema Concept of Ideals in Legal Theory 11.  
79  Especially Raz 1972 Yale LJ 823 ff and Alexy Zum Begriff des Rechtsprinzips 59 ff.  
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When we take a closer look at the environmental legal principles that usually are to be 
found in international and national legal documents, a rough distinction can be made 
between principles of a more substantive nature and procedural principles. The 
precautionary principle and the “polluter pays” principle are examples of the first category. 
Principles on the access to information, participation in decision-making and access to 
justice are examples of the second category. Usually, procedural principles are less 
abstract than substantive ones, and therefore look more like rules. A good example is 
Principle 23 from the World Charter for Nature:80  
  
All persons, in accordance with their national legislation, shall have the 
opportunity to participate, individually or with others, in the formulation of 
decisions of direct concern to their environment, and shall have access to 
means of redress when their environment has suffered damage or degradation.  
  
Although of a more procedural nature, this principle is an important link between the ideal 
of sustainable development and concrete rules on access to decision-making processes 
and access to justice. As the WCED has shown, sustainable development is closely linked 
to the role of NGOs and private and community groups.81 Agenda 21 states:  
  
One of the fundamental prerequisites82 for the achievement of sustainable 
development is broad public participation in decision-making.83  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80  Adopted by the General Assembly of the UN on 29 October 1982 Doc A/37/L 4.  
81  The need for information and participation of the public has also been stressed in the second report 
 by the Club of Rome: King and Schneider First Global Revolution 73, 114, 246.  
82  In his report on the application of the Rio Declaration, the Secretary-General cites this sentence 
 using the word “principle” instead of “prerequisite”, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
 Development: Application and Implementation, Report of the Secretary-General, Commission on 
 Sustainable Development, Fifth session, 7-25 April 1997, UN Distr GEN E/CN 17/1997/8, 17.  
83  UN Doc A/CONF151/26/Vol I-III, reprinted in Johnson Earth Summit 405 (par 23.2).  
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One of the ideas in the concept of sustainable development is that the role of citizens in 
environmental policy must be recognized and strengthened, firstly, because the (potential) 
deterioration of man’s environment may affect his individual environment in such a way that 
basic rights can no longer be exercised,84 and secondly, because interests that have no 
voice of their own are concerned, i.e. the interest of nature and of future generations. The 
ideal of sustainable development means that interests of future generations are not harmed 
by today’s decisions or actions. To give these interests a voice, organisations and 
individuals can be given the opportunity to defend the interests of their descendants and of 
nature. Since this idea forms a basic part of the ideal of sustainable development, and 
because there is a lot of discussion going on considering the so-called anthropocentric 
character of the ideal of sustainable development, I will go into this matter more profoundly 
in paragraph 5.  
  
  
2.4   How do principles originate?  
I have stated that the high moral value of principles comes from an underlying ideal, using 
the example of sustainable development. But many of the now generally accepted 
principles of environmental law already existed before the ideal of sustainable development 
really became important internationally. Sands distinguishes between existing legal 
principles and new principles emerging in the context of sustainable development.85 An 
existing principle is, for instance, the principle of co-operation (essentially Principles 9 and 
27 of the Rio Declaration, but also present in Principles 5, 7, 12, 13, 14 and 24), that was 
included in many other international environmental documents as well. The principle can 
be traced back as early as 1933 to the Convention Relative to the Preservation of Flora 
and Fauna in their Natural States.86 A relatively new principle is the precautionary principle 
that, at the international level, began to appear in the mid-1980s.87  
 
 
 
 
 
 
84  Such as the right to privacy and family life, laid down in a 8 of the European Convention for the 
 Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Council of Europe 
 http://conventions.coe.int 14 Feb. See, for instance, the famous case of López Ostra v. Spain of the 
 European Court of Human Rights, December 9 1994, 1994 Human Rights LJ 444-447. For an 
 overview of human rights involved in environmental degradation, see Churchill Environmental 
 Rights 89-108.  
85  Sands “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development” 54.  
86  Example given by Sands “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development” 63.  
87  Sands Principles of International Environmental Law 208.  
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This, however, does not mean that existing principles cannot have their roots in the ideal of 
sustainable development. Firstly, we have defined an ideal as a value that can be implicit in 
the law or the public and moral culture of a society. It is not farfetched to argue that the 
idea of sustainable development, however not explicitly formulated as such,88 was already 
on the (international) scene since World War II.89 Secondly, it can be argued that, since the 
break through of the ideal of sustainable development, the existing principles were strongly 
influenced by this ideal. Their meaning has not been the same since. An example is the co-
operation principle, which, as shown above, already existed for a long time in international 
environmental law. Since the UNCED, the idea of co-operation is not only aimed at the 
prevention of environmental damage in neighbouring states (bilateral or regional), but at a 
much broader aim: sustainable development for the world community (global).90 This, 
among other things, means that developed states should make (technological) knowledge 
on environmental management available to developing countries, not as “aid”, but as a 
common obligation or responsibility.91 Here we have a new meaning for an old principle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 The word “sustainable” was used sometimes in international agreements on the conservation of 
whales and seals, such as the 1957 Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, 314 
UNTS 105. These conventions mainly aimed at securing future exploitation of these animals by 
man. A II (1) states: “In order to realize the objectives of this Convention, the Parties agree to 
coordinate necessary scientific research programs and to coordinate in investigating the fur seal 
resources of the North Pacific Ocean to determine: (a) what measures may be necessary to make 
possible the maximum sustainable productivity of the fur seal resources so that the fur seals 
populations can be brought to an maintained at the levels which will provide the greatest harvest 
year after year; and (b) [...]”.Sands “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development” 59 
gives another example: the 1946 International Whaling Convention.  
89   Sands “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development” 306 ff shows us that since 1946 
there are many landmarks in the development of a more integrated economic, social and 
environmental approach in international law.   
90   UN Dept for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, Report of the Expert Group Meeting 
on Identification of Principles of International Law for Sustainable Development, Background paper 
no. 3, New York 1996, 19 ff.  
91  Porras Rio Declaration 28-29.  
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But all this still gives no answer to the question in the title of this section. If a norm has all 
the characteristics of a principle, who then decides that this norm can be applied in the law 
as a principle? When we take environmental legal principles as an example, it is clear that 
it is mainly on the international level that most of the currently known principles have been 
initiated. Norms that have been included time after time in important international legal 
documents like treaties and declarations as “principles”, can be considered to be legal 
principles.92 The same holds for norms that have been applied as principles by the courts 
according to legal precedent. One reference by a court to a norm as a “principle” does not 
yet make this norm a real principle. Generally, a norm slowly evolves to something that can 
be called a principle.93 There has to be a continuing reference by the courts to a norm 
before it can be called a principle.  
In both cases there has to be some durable practice in the (legal) community to make a 
norm a principle and a sense of appropriateness;94 even when a norm is first called a 
“principle”, that norm might have been considered principal for a longer period of time 
already. It is not possible to create a principle by formulating a norm as such in a statute or 
in a judgement, as it is not possible to decide to change a principle. At a given point we 
notice that, because of a change of law or normative perception, a principle has acquired a 
somewhat different meaning. I already mentioned the example of the principle of co-
operation.  
  
  
2.5  Conclusion: the ideal of sustainable development as the basis for legal 
principles of environmental law  
I can now answer my first question. The high moral value of principles comes from 
underlying ideals. An ideal is a value that is explicit, implicit or latent in the law, or the 
public and moral culture of a society or group, that usually cannot be fully realised, and that 
partly transcends contingent, historical formulations, and implementations in terms of rules 
and principles. Since the explicit formulation of the ideal of sustainable development in 
1987, principles of environmental law have been greatly influenced by this ideal.95 The 
aspiration of the ideal of sustainable development can only be promoted by concrete legal 
rules, by the morality of duty. Or, as Fuller puts it  
 
92   I do not here wish to elaborate on the question whether these “environmental principles” can be 
seen as sources of international environmental law, such as “general legal principles” or “ius 
cogens” (A 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice).  
93   MacCormick Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory 159.  
94   Dworkin Model of Rules 40. This does not mean that everyone in the community has to agree on the 
content or on the importance of the moral value of the principle.  
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…for workable standards of judgment the law must turn (however) to its blood 
cousin, the morality of duty. [...] what the morality of aspiration loses in direct 
relevance for the law, it gains in the pervasiveness of its implications.96   
  
To bridge the gap between the highly abstract ideal and the very concrete substantive and 
procedural legal rules, legal principles of environmental law are a necessary link between 
the ideal of sustainable development and concrete environmental legislation.  
  
  
3   From principles to rules and policies  
My second question was: what is the exact difference between a principle and a legal rule, 
and between a principle and a policy goal? I will deal with the first half of the question in 
section 3.1, and with the second half of the question in section 3.2. Again, I will use the 
principles related to the ideal of sustainable development as the prime source of examples 
to illustrate my line of reasoning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
95  The question might arise whether legal principles have an influence on ideals: have existing legal 
principles influenced the meaning of the ideal of sustainable development as well? Such interaction 
is very well imaginable, especially now it is argued later in this article that principles not only 
influence more concrete legal rules, but that the application of these rules have an influence on the 
meaning of the principles as well.  
96  Fuller Morality of Law 9.  
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3.1   Principles versus rules  
Dworkin has made a distinction between principles and rules. This distinction has been 
criticised by many, but, as stated above, can in general be upheld (cf section C). Principles 
differ from rules in the sense that rules can be more easily directly applied in individual 
cases, while principles give a general direction for a decision, with a much lesser required 
outcome, than would be the case with legal rules. It must be acknowledged that this 
difference is not a very strict one. There is a sliding scale with a theoretical abstract and 
indeterminate principle on one side and a very concrete, highly practical rule on the other. 
Both principles and rules can range from abstract to more concrete. Principles can become 
rules over time, when directly applicable in concrete cases. As already mentioned, the 
basic difference between rules and principles lies in the higher moral character of principles 
and in their role as a link between ideals and legal rules.  
  
The higher moral character of principles forms the basis for their functions in legal practice. 
I distinguish nine functions, which are roughly sketched below.  
  
1. Principles can enhance the normative power of statutory rules. Very often in 
environmental legislation, statutory rules are extremely open and mostly of a 
procedural nature, so that further guidance is desirable for all parties involved (those 
addressed by a rule and third parties, such as environmental organisations 
monitoring the company’s behaviour). The rule that for a certain type of industry a 
permit is needed “in the interest of the environment” and that “negative effects for 
the environment must, as much as possible, be prevented or limited” is not very 
clear (examples taken from the Netherlands Environmental Management Act 1993). 
And the law that states, that in a specially protected area of natural beauty certain 
activities can only be carried out after a permit has been obtained, but that does not 
give any clue as to what criteria such a request must be tested against and under 
what conditions such a permit can be granted, acquires a greater normative power if 
principles are included in the statute itself, or if the rules in practice are influenced 
by unwritten principles.  
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2. Principles can help to define open or unclear statutory rules. This function follows 
from the first one and is aimed at administrative authorities and courts. Principles 
can be used by administrative authorities as well as the courts in the process of 
interpreting statutory rules in concrete cases, especially in cases where the rules 
are unclear or leave the competent authorities a great deal of room for discretion, or 
where there are conflicting rules.  
3. Principles can increase legal certainty and enhance the legitimacy of decision-
making. Because of the normative guidance offered by legal principles, both the 
administration and the judiciary are more or less obliged to motivate a decision in 
the light of the relevant principles, offering citizens more certainty as to what are 
important arguments for the decision and thus enhancing its legitimacy.  
4. Principles form the basis for new statutory rules. Principles also give guidance to 
rulemakers, at national, European and international levels. They set the goals that 
have to be reached with (new) rules and thus create stability and legal certainty and 
they make sure that there is, to a certain extent, systematization of legal rules.  
5. Principles give guidance to self-regulation and negotiation processes between 
various actors in society, such as NGOs, authorities and businesses, or otherwise 
help to determine how private parties should behave in the social order. In a time of 
a declining role for direct regulation and government intervention, and a growing call 
for deregulation and self-regulation,97 principles can give some guidance. Firstly, 
principles form a normative basis in negotiation processes among social actors in 
decision-making processes of co-production and/or self-regulation (companies, local 
residents, environmental groups, governmental agencies).98 Secondly, when 
detailed rules are abolished in a deregulation programme, principles become more 
important to fill in or interpret the remaining (open) rules (see under 2). Sometimes 
the principles themselves are explicitly formulated in a process of self-regulation as 
well, like, for example, the Valdez Principles (drafted directly after the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill in Alaska in 1989, by a group of business people and investors).99  
 
97  Golub New Instruments 4 ff; Verschuuren “EC Environmental Law and Self-Regulation” 103-121. 
See also Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Environmental Agreements, 27 November 1996, COM(96) 561 final and the Commission 
Recommendation 96/733 of 9 December 1996 concerning Environmental Agreements implementing 
Community directives, 1996 Official Journal L333/59.  
98  Sometimes called “shared decision-making”, cf Williams, Penrose and Hawkes “Shared Decision-
Making” 860. See for these “new” styles of decision-making Glasbergen (ed) Co-operative 
Environmental Governance.  
99  The group called itself “Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies” (CERES). The Valdez 
Principles have been reprinted in an article on the subject: Anon 1990 Environmental Forum 35. The 
(new) CERES-principles can be found at the CERES http://www.ceres.org 14 Feb.  
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6. Principles create flexibility in the law. The sixth function is very much related to the 
fourth and fifth function. Since principles only point in a direction, without 
necessitating a specific outcome, principles are by their nature flexible norms. They 
make it possible for rulemakers to make less detailed rules and thus create more 
flexibility in the law. Principles offer the necessary beacons for such legislation.  
7. Principles have to play an important role in national legal systems and in the EU, 
because they help to implement international obligations. In many important 
international legal documents, although not always legally binding, principles have 
been laid down as important guiding norms. To do justice to these principles, they 
must be seriously considered by nations that have signed international legal 
documents such as the Rio Declaration.  
8. Principles stimulate integration of environmental considerations into other policy 
fields. Principles can also give guidance to decisions in other fields of policy that 
have an impact on the environment, such as decisions concerning transportation, 
energy, agriculture, and technology. In this way, they help to integrate 
environmental considerations into these other fields of policy. ‘ 
9. Principles are necessary to pursue an ideal. Last but not least and already stated 
above, principles are a necessary link between ideals and concrete legal rules.  
  
What is clear from these functions is the close relationship between principles and rules. 
Sands even states that “the substantive legal meaning of principles emerges only in their 
application to a given set of facts”,100 and I think he is right. Rules and principles almost 
become one in the process of application of both of them. A rule is applied in the light of a 
relevant principle, and thus the principle influences the meaning of the rule.101 At the same 
time, the application of this rule (in the light of the relevant principle), gives the principle a 
clearer meaning than the principle has on its own: we see the relevance of a principle for 
legal practice especially when applying and interpreting rules in concrete cases or when 
making (new) rules.  
  
100   Sands “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development” 56.  
101  “To attempt to [apply principles] in total disregard of all other considerations [...] edges over into  
 fanaticism” according to McLoughlin and Bellinger Environmental Pollution Control 155.  
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Therefore, using principles by no means implies that we are not using rules.102 On the 
contrary, Sands states that, in the end, the influence of a principle on rules might even 
have become so strong, that it becomes a rule with a clear and unconditional content.103 
His example, the principle of sovereignty over natural resources and the responsibility not 
to cause damage to the environment of other states (Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration and 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration), however, is not convincing. The fact that this 
principle is the “cornerstone of international environmental law” and that it can be enforced 
before international courts and tribunals,104 does not mean that it has become a rule. The 
basic moral character of the principle remains intact, and the principle of sovereignty 
clearly has all the nine functions mentioned above. Although a legal principle can become 
very clear and unconditional in legal practice, it will still be considered as a principle and 
not as a rule. A principle, by its nature, keeps its specific functions, and therefore it is 
important to keep the basic difference between principles and rules in mind.  
 
This goes for rules in various legal documents, such as acts and regulations, as well as 
transnational regulations, and selfregulatory rules. Principles thus are dynamic beacons in 
a wild ocean of ever changing concrete environmental rules. De Sadeleer stresses this 
special position of “directing principles”: they can be an interface between modern and 
post-modern law, that is, between fixed standards and pragmatic and reversible rules.105  
 
3.2   Principles versus policies  
A third category distinguished by Dworkin, besides principles and rules, are policies. A 
policy, according to Dworkin, is “that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, 
generally an improvement in some economic, political or social feature of the community”, 
while a principle “is a standard to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an 
economic, political or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of 
justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality.”106 To give an example in the field 
of environmental policy and law: the standard that in the Netherlands CO2 emissions in 
 
 
 
102   As is stated by Lawson 1997 Iowa Law Review 903.  
103   Sands “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development” 56.  
104  Sands “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development” 186-194.  
105  De Sadeleer Environmental Principles 371.  
106  Dworkin Model of Rules 22.  
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2005 must have to be 5% below the level of 1990 is a policy goal. Such a goal may have 
been laid down in policy documents like policy plans or may just be a statement by the 
competent policy maker in the relevant democratic forum, for instance, the minister of the 
environment. Although not a principle or a rule in itself, such a policy goal does play a role 
in environmental law in two ways. First, legislation can determine that certain policy goals 
or policy statements have to be taken into account in a certain decision-making process. 
Secondly, a decision maker can be bound to his or her own policy on the basis of general 
principles of proper administrative action.  
 
Still there remains a difference between rules and policies: rules have to be applicated 
directly. The policy goal on CO2 emissions mentioned above can be transformed in the 
directly applicable and enforceable rule that, in 2001, industry X will not be allowed to emit 
more CO2 than a total of 300,000 tonnes.  
  
The difference between a policy and a principle might seem more problematic in practice, 
especially in a specific policy field like in that of the protection of the environment. Still, 
there are some big theoretical differences, which make it essential to differentiate between 
them. Principles are legal norms that, although not directly applicable (only via rules), have 
much more and a much more constant weight in legal practice. Principles have to be 
applied and cannot very easily be ignored because of their high moral content. When a 
relevant principle is passed over without good reason, a court will quash the decision. 
Policies have much less legal influence: a court will test a decision primarily against its 
accordance to binding legal principles and rules. Only in the two situations mentioned 
above (a statute explicitly obliged to take a certain policy document into account, or 
indirectly via the general principles of proper administrative action) policy documents can 
play a role in a judicial procedure against a government decision. In this case, however, it 
will be much easier for the government to give reasons acceptable to a court, not to follow 
the policy goal in a specific case. Also, policies may be changed overnight; principles, 
however, are embedded in the legal culture and, although their precise content may vary 
from time to time, principles remain relevant for a long period of time.  
Principles even have a strong influence on policies. It is not very well conceivable that a 
policy is announced that is contrary to certain principles of environmental policy and law. 
Principles thus influence not only the making and application of concrete rules, they also 
affect policies. When a State has adopted the “polluter pays” principle as a leading 
principle of environmental law, it will prove to be difficult for the competent authority to 
formulate a policy stating that, for the next five years, extra environmental taxes will be 
imposed on all people in order to raise funds to combat the consequences of acidification 
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by the bio-industry. Such a policy will meet criticism in the political and social debate, but it 
will also be more difficult to implement in legal practice, since a decision implementing such 
policy would be contrary to the legal principle and might be quashed by the court.   
  
4  From ideals to rules and policies  
Policies do play an important part in the promotion of an ideal, such as the ideal of 
sustainable development, as do principles and rules. All are different standards necessary 
in our efforts to reach the ideal. Because of the different functions and the different legal 
meanings of these standards, I think it is crucial that in legal documents these differences 
are observed. It ís possible to formulate the ideal of sustainable development as a policy or 
a principle or as a rule, but this is not very practical. Following rule refers to the very 
abstract and vague notion of sustainable development, and therefore is not very useful; at 
least as far as the last few words are concerned:107  
  
Member States shall draw up a list of zones and agglomerations in which the 
levels of pollutants are below the limit values. Member States shall maintain the 
levels of pollutants in these zones and agglomerations below the limit values 
and shall endeavour to preserve the best ambient air quality, compatible with 
sustainable development.  
  
To focus on the ideal of sustainable development again, the entire structure of principles, 
rules and policies is as follows. To make the ideal of sustainable development more 
concrete and to have it implemented in concrete legal decisions, principles, such as the 
precautionary principle or the “polluter pays” principle, form a necessary link between the 
ideal, on one hand, and rules and policies, on the other. Both the formulation and the 
application of concrete legal rules are influenced by these principles. As far as abstract 
policies are concerned, ideals can more or less directly influence these (for instance, the 
policy of the minister of foreign aid to pay more attention to environmental issues when 
deciding on new aid programmes may be a consequence of the ideal of sustainable 
development). For the more concrete policies, this ideal is too abstract. In those cases, 
policies, like rules, are influenced by principles, but they also need enforceable legal rules 
in order to be achieved.   
 
 
107  Example taken from Council Directive 96/62/EC, article 9, 1996 Official Journal L 296/55.  
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5  From man to nature  
The ideal of sustainable development seems very anthropocentric: economic development 
of all nations, especially developing countries, must be stimulated, but the environment and 
natural resources may not be used in an unsustainable manner in order to preserve their 
potential use for future generations. With sustainable development, the ethical principles 
involved are about responsibilities among groups of human beings: developed versus 
developing and present versus future.108   
  
Still, with sustainable development being an ideal of international environmental policy and 
law, which influences principles and environmental legal rules, the question arises of 
whether or not this is acceptable. Is the ideal really an anthropocentric ideal? If this is the 
case, it might be unacceptable that the legal principles and rules in the field of 
environmental law are being influenced by an anthropocentric ideal.  
  
  
5.1   Sustainable development: an anthropocentric ideal?  
It has generally been accepted that human interests cannot be separated from the 
protection of the environment. Protection of the environment because of human interests 
therefore has spill-over effects to non-humans (animals and nature).109 Even the 1946 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, which declares its purposes for the 
benefit of sustainable human exploitation,110 thus has a spill-over effect. But it must be 
acknowledged that this is not a very satisfactory approach to the issue of the aim of 
environmental policy and law in general and the aim of the ideal of sustainable 
development in particular.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108  Shue 1995 International Affairs 458.  
109  Redgwell Life, the Universe and Everything 87.  
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Nature and the environment are entities worth moral consideration in their own right, not 
just because we need them for our survival or for our well-being.111 From this perspective 
one might ignore any reference to human interests or stewardship. This idea has been 
elaborated by some in the sense that, as natural objects have their own dignity, they 
should also be considered legal subjects, and have standing before the courts. Not just 
animals should be considered as legal entities possessing rights,112 but also mountains, 
rivers, plants, etc.113 These entities should be enabled, through guardians, to enforce their 
rights in courts for the benefit of the entities themselves.  
  
I reject this approach. It has, quite acceptably, been argued that non-living entities, other 
than animals and possibly plants, cannot have interests of their own because they have no 
moral claim,114 which, for a matter of fact, does not necessarily mean that natural objects 
do not have an inherent value.115   
  
If it cannot matter to canyon or trees if they are irreparably damaged, how are 
their guardians to know what to argue on their behalf, other than by using their 
own values?116   
  
We cannot exactly determine what is in the welfare of trees, rivers, habitats etc. The 
introduction of a limited amount of phosphates in a river disturbs the natural balance of the 
river, but on the other hand, it enriches plant and animal life in that same river. Now, what 
is in the best interest of the river? Also more practical questions remain unsolved: who 
should be appointed as a guardian, how must the guardian exercise the powers related to 
the rights of nature, what can the guardian do with the benefits of the exercise of these 
powers, etc?  
 
 
 
 
 
110   Mentioned as an example of anthropocentric international environmental law by Boyle Role of 
International Human Rights Law 51.  
111  This might even extend over inanimate nature, like rivers, rocks, Brennan Moral Standing of Natural 
Objects 35-54.  
112  Cf, among many others, Regan Case for Animal Rights.  
113  Besides the famous publication by Stone 1972 Southern California LR 450-501, the same thought 
has been put forward in German by, among many others, Bosselman 1986 Kritische Justiz 1-22 and 
Leimbacher Die Rechte der Natur.  
114  Regan 1976 Philosophical Quarterly 253; Elder 1994 Osgoode Hall LJ 288.  
115 Regan 1981 Environmental Ethics 30-31; Cahen 1988 Environmental Ethics 200, as reprinted in 
Brennan (ed) Ethics of the Environment 142.  
116  Elder 1994 Osgoode Hall LJ 289.  
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These questions cannot be solved in our legal system. It is based on the social contract 
and it is especially meant to regulate human conduct in such a way that the exercise of 
certain fundamental liberties by all will be assured and that all will be provided with the 
necessary collective goods. The functions of constitutional and statutory law are aimed at 
people, with obligations and rights for people. Because of our attitude towards nature and 
the inherent value that we (human beings) consider nature and the environment to have, 
we can regulate our behaviour towards nature and the environment, but even then, the law 
deals with people alone.  
  
The idea that nature has an inherent value cannot easily be found in UNCED documents 
on sustainable development. These documents represent rather anthropocentric views. 
Even the chapters of Agenda 21 aimed at protection of fragile ecosystems, such as 
wetlands, or at protection of biodiversity, have been written from the thought that natural 
entities have to be protected for man’s own sake. They are our resources:  
  
Biological resources feed and clothe us and provide housing, medicines and 
spiritual nourishment [...]. The current decline in biodiversity is largely the result 
of human activity and represents a serious threat to human development.117   
  
The already mentioned first principle of the Rio Declaration states:   
  
Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They 
are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
117 UN Doc A/CONF151/26/Vol I-III, reprinted in Johnson Earth Summit 287-288.  
J VERSCHUUREN  PER/PELJ 2006(9)1 
246/261 
 
Some ecocentric elements can be found in the Convention on Biological Diversity, which 
also was concluded at the UNCED in 1992.118 The preamble starts as follows:   
  
Conscious of the intrinsic value of biological diversity and the ecological, 
genetic, social, economic, scientific, educational cultural, recreational and 
aesthetic values of biological diversity and its components, [...].  
  
However, Article 1 of the Convention, which lists the objectives of the Convention, has the 
familiar anthropocentric tone again:   
  
The objectives of this Convention [...] are the conservation of biological 
diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, 
including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate 
transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those 
resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding.  
  
  
5.2   Is an anthropocentric ideal acceptable?  
Although there has been a great deal of criticism on this anthropocentric tone in the 
UNCED documents,119 the ideal of sustainable development is not entirely incompatible 
with the idea that nature is worth protecting in its own right. True, the idea that nature and 
the environment are worth protecting, even when there is no human interest involved, 
cannot be found in any international documents on the ideal of sustainable development. 
However, this does not mean that it is not possible to keep the intrinsic value in focus while 
regulating human behaviour. Two lines of reasoning can be followed here.  
  
Firstly, man is part of nature and cannot be separated from it. He depends on the existence 
of healthy and balanced ecosystems. Damaging the fragile balance of nature may be 
damaging to human beings as well. Man is dependent on ecosystems for the production of 
food, medicines, housing, and clothing. But:  
 
 
 
 
118  1992 ILM 818.  
119  Among others: Pallemaerts International Environmental Law 12-13.  
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…man does not live by food and fiber alone; he also needs a balanced CO2-O2 
atmosphere, the climatic buffer provided by oceans and masses of vegetation, 
and clean (that is, unproductive) water for cultural and industrial uses.120   
  
Since there still is a lot of uncertainty as to what the consequences of human actions are 
for the balance of ecosystems, for the conservation of biological diversity, for the climate 
system, a precautionary approach is advocated in the relevant international environmental 
law.121 This precautionary approach means that even when there is no conclusive 
evidence of harm to the environment, activities that could cause harm should be prohibited 
or should be bound by protective measures.122 Such an approach means that not just 
human interests in restricted sense must be considered, but all possible interests 
concerning nature and the environment, all of which might influence human existence.  
  
If we extend the precautionary approach to future generations as well, the line of reasoning 
becomes even stronger. The extinction of species of plants or animals can limit the options 
of future generations, so sustainable development requires the conservation of plant and 
animal species, even if they are not of direct value to the life of present day man.123 To 
preserve these options for future generations, legal measures protecting the environment 
must be made by the present generation.124  
  
The second argument can be that there is a moral relationship between man and nature. It 
has been argued that protecting nature is morally the best thing to do: it is an “ideal of 
human excellence”.125 This argument leads us back to the concept of ideals as elaborated 
above, ideals as values that are explicit, implicit or latent in the law, or the public and moral 
culture of a society or group that usually cannot be fully realised, and that partly transcend 
contingent, historical formulations, and implementations in terms of rules and principles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
120  Odum 1969 Science 164, reprinted in Nelissen, Van der Straaten and Klinkers (eds) Environmental 
 Studies 135.  
121  Hohmann Precautionary Legal Duties 341-345.  
122  Backes and Verschuuren Precautionary Principle 58.  
123  See WCED Our Common Future 46.  
124 Brown Weiss 1990 AJIL 198-207. According to Brown Weiss, the legal implementation of the 
concept of protecting the environment for future generations is conducted along three lines: 
conservation of options, conservation of quality and conservation of access.  
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It is not farfetched to suggest that there is a human ideal which the beetle 
crusher does not attain. Nor is it idle to suggest that a person who has been 
exposed to B and reacted to B the grandeur of great valleys or the majesty of 
mountains is better for it, than if he had passed the time playing pushpin.126   
  
Often cited in this respect is also Kant:   
  
A propensity to the bare destruction [...] of beautiful though lifeless things in 
nature is contrary to man’s duty to himself. For such a propensity weakens or 
destroys that feeling in man [...] which [...] does much to promote a state of 
sensibility favorable to morals [...].127  
  
Stone calls this “anthropocentric idealism”, as opposed to other forms of idealism, among 
which “entity idealism”,128 which suggests that the destruction of natural objects is wrong 
because the object is a good intrinsically: destruction is wrong irrespective of the 
consequences for the virtue or welfare of human beings. Contrary to Stone, I think it is safe 
to say that, because of the inherent value of natural objects, man has a duty to himself not 
to destroy this object. The (anthropocentric) ideal of human excellence therefore is closely 
linked to the idea that nature is intrinsically good: man can only reach this ideal when he 
realizes that nature has an inherent value.129  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
125  Terminology used by Cahen 1988 Environmental Ethics 215.  
126  Stone 1985 Southern California LR 51.  
127  Kant Metaphysical Principles of Virtue 105-106.  
128  Stone 1985 Southern California LR 52.  
129  The Aristotelian approach set out by O’Neill 1992 The Monist 132-133, reprinted in Brennan (ed) 
Ethics of the Environment 68. Although this approach takes into consider-ation the intrinsic value of 
non-human entities, it must be admitted that a greater preference or value, on the basis of species, 
is given to humans, which has been called a weaker form of human chauvinism: Routley and 
Routley Human Chauvinism 104.  
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This moral relationship is reflected in the “last person on Earth scenario”: the sole survivor 
on Earth of a nuclear war has the possibility, before dying, to push a button, destroying 
some surviving objects, like the Amazon rainforest, the last remaining herd of elephants or 
even non-natural objects with some intrinsic value like a painting by Van Gogh. It is morally 
wrong to do so because these objects have an intrinsic value and therefore not destroying 
them contributes to the virtue of man, to a flourishing human existence.   
  
The best human life is one that includes an awareness of and practical concern 
with the goods of entities in the non-human world. [...] care for the natural world 
for its own sake is a part of the best life for humans [...].130  
  
In both of the above interpretations, the seemingly anthropocentric ideal of sustainable 
development has a strong link to more ecocentric approaches of environmental law and 
policy. Environmental protection is necessary to achieve economic and moral goals of 
man, but in order to do so, all possible consequences for the environment must be 
considered carefully, thoroughly and precautiously, keeping in mind the intrinsic value of 
nature. This approach, however, does not entirely solve the problem that we cannot 
determine objectively how clean precisely a river must be.   
  
Stone has argued to solve the latter problem by introducing an ideal-oriented construct:   
  
[...] while we cannot orient the law to a Thing’s welfare, we can orient it to some 
ideal state of the Thing, without [...] undertaking to express that ideal in a 
specific set of numbers.131   
  
This interesting approach, which, although on a different level, has some of the 
characteristics of the concept of ideal-oriented environmental law as described above, can 
also be used in a more ecological approach of the ideal of sustainable development.  In my 
view, to make sure that these ecological aspects of the ideal of sustainable development 
are sufficiently advanced in decision-making processes by governmental authorities and 
the courts, the principles that rule environmental decision-making processes must create 
enough room to take into account the more eco-centred arguments that can be found in all 
decision-making processes where environmental issues are at 
 
 
 
 
130  O’Neill 1992 The Monist 69.  
131  Stone Nonperson in Law 62-63.  
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stake. Most of the environmental legal principles prevailing in international and national 
environmental law reflect this idea. The precautionary principle has already been 
mentioned as an example. Legal rules that are influenced by the precautionary principle 
must compel the government to constantly review its policy in the light of the interests of 
future generations and the environment (and to make laws that guarantee such a review), 
and to assess the impact administrative decisions may have on the quality of the 
environment, including the intrinsic value of natural objects. Legislators may even explicitly 
state that when exercising certain powers, the competent authorities must act according to 
the principle that “the intrinsic value of animals is recognized”.132  
  
Another example is the “polluter pays” principle, which is not only relevant to damage to a 
person or a person’s possessions, but also to damage to natural objects with no direct 
economic relevance, like Alaska’s Prince William Sound, where in 1989 oil from the Exxon 
Valdez spoiled a great deal of the then present natural objects.  
  
Procedural principles like the principles of participation in decision-making processes and 
access to justice in environmental matters for interested parties also play an important part 
in realising the ideal of sustainable development in the broad sense, mentioned above, as 
illustrated by the 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.133 The government has 
to pursue an open kind of decision-making when the environment is concerned. 
Participation of citizens and the possibility of judicial review are essential when deciding on 
environmental matters or on other matters which may have consequences for the quality of 
the environment.134 Exceptions to this rule cannot very easily be justified, at least not in this 
approach of environmental constitutional democracy: everyone has a responsibility towards 
(voiceless) future generations and natural objects, and everyone must at least be able to 
fulfil this responsibility, in order to promote the ideal of “human excellence”.  
 
 
 
132  As laid down in a 1a of the Dutch Experiments on Animals Act, which entered into force in 1997,  
 1996 Bulletin of Acts and Orders 500.  
133  UN Distr Gen ECE/CEP/43, 21 April 1998, reprinted in 1999 ILM 517. The preambular paragraphs 
of this Convention recognise “that every person has the right to live in an environment adequate to 
his or her health and well-being, and the duty, both individually and in association with others, to 
protect and improve the environment for the benefit of present and future generations,” and consider 
“that, to be able to assert this right and observe this duty, citizens must have access to information, 
be entitled to participate in decision-making and have access to justice in environmental matters, 
and acknowledging in this regard that citizens may need assistance in order to exercise their rights 
[...]”.  
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6 Conclusion  
Principles of environmental law receive their high moral value from underlying ideals, most 
notably the ideal of sustainable development. An ideal is a value that is explicit, implicit or 
latent in the law, or the public and moral culture of a society or group that usually cannot be 
fully realized, and that partly transcends contingent, historical formulations, and 
implementations in terms of rules and principles. The ideal of sustainable development has 
been explicitly laid down in many international, European and national legal documents, 
both of a binding and a non-binding nature. The ideal strongly influences existing and new 
principles of environmental law, and, through the principles, also more concrete legal rules 
and policies.  
 
Principles form a necessary link between directly applicable and enforceable environmental 
legal rules and the underlying ideal. They are a necessary medium for ideals to find their 
way into concrete statutory and treaty rules and standards and can be used to bridge the 
gap between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration. Because of their basis in 
(written or unwritten) law and their possible direct and intense influence on legal rules 
concerning activities that may harm the environment, they must be placed within the 
morality of duty: a bridgehead within the morality of duty reaching out for the morality of 
aspiration. From the general function of principles of forming a beachhead in the morality of 
duty, nine more concrete functions can be derived. These functions principles, both of a 
substantive and of a procedural nature, have, make it possible to distinguish them from 
legal rules. It must be acknowledged, however, that there is no very strict separation 
between principles on one side and rules on the other: environmental norms can be placed 
on a sliding scale with rules on one side and principles on the other side. Principles can 
become rules over time, when directly applicable in concrete cases.   
 
 
 
  
134  This has explicitly and unmistakably been recognised in international environmental law with the 
adoption of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters in 1998, of which the first article reads as follows: “In 
order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of present and future generations to 
live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, each Party shall guarantee the 
rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in 
environmental matters in accordance with the provisions of this Convention” 1999 ILM 517.  
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The nine functions are following:  
1. principles can enhance the normative power of statutory rules;  
2. principles can help to fill in open or unclear statutory rules;  
3. principles can increase legal certainty and enhance the legitimacy of decision-  
    making;  
4. principles form the basis for new statutory rules;  
5. principles give guidance to self-regulation;  
6. principles create flexibility in the law;  
7. principles help to implement international obligations;  
8. principles stimulate integration of environmental considerations into other policy 
    fields;  
9. principles are necessary to pursue an ideal.  
  
 
Principles thus influence the meaning of a rule but, at the same time, the application of a 
rule in a concrete case gives the relevant principle a clearer meaning than the principle has 
on its own. This goes for rules in various legal documents, such as acts and regulations, as 
well as trans-national regulations, and self regulatory rules. Principles thus are dynamic 
beacons in a wild ocean of ever changing concrete environmental rules.  
  
Although the underlying ideal of sustainable development has a rather anthropocentric 
character, the danger of influencing environmental legal principles (and through principles 
legal rules and policies as well) in a highly anthropocentric way is small. Firstly, because 
man is an inseparable part of nature and is very much dependent on balanced and intact 
ecosystems, especially when future generations are considered as well. Secondly, there is 
a moral relationship between man and nature. Natural objects have an inherent value: not 
destroying these objects contributes to the virtue of man.  
  
The ecological aspects of the ideal of sustainable development can be sufficiently 
advanced in decision-making processes by governmental authorities and courts, because 
most principles that rule environmental decision-making processes create enough room to 
take into account the more eco-centred arguments.  
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